Shtypi i huaj rreth Kosovës

[Arb]

Po hap kete teme, per te postuar reagime (te anetareve te FD), dhe te tjereve, drejtuar te gjithe atyre shkrimeve (te mediave te shkruara dhe elektronike) pro-Shkijeve qe javet e fundit (me nguti) po propagandojne kunder njohjes zyrtare te Pavaresise se Kosoves.











Kosovo deserves independence

As a regular Post reader, I was disappointed by Caroline B. Glick's recent column "Islam and the nation-state" (November 13). It promulgated numerous misconceptions about Kosovo and the Kosovo Albanians.
Glick writes: "Today the US and the EU are leading the charge toward the establishment of a Palestinian state and the creation of an independent state of Kosovo" - as if the two issues were related. There is no connection between being for the establishing of a state of Kosovo and the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is wrong to compare Kosovo with the Palestinian case simply because they have one thing in common - the Muslim religion. Analogy, goes the saying, is no substitute for analysis.

Israel opposes an imposed solution on Kosovo, but the Israeli government has given its full support to the Contact Group principles - one of them being the non-return of Kosovo to the situation before 1999. Kosovo is not a minority-dominated enclave within some other nation-state, as Glick claims. Serbia's power is not being eroded as there is no longer any Yugoslavia. Kosovo, under the UN's mandate since 1999, has already established its state institutions, independent of Serbia.
FOR READERS to better understand why Glick is mistaken in her analogy, it is necessary to know some basic truths about Kosovo: The area was annexed by Yugoslavia, against Kosovar resistance in 1918. This annexation violated the right of the Kosovars to self-determination and, therefore, violated international law.
Although Kosovo Albanians constitute 92% of the population of Kosovo, the autonomy it enjoyed was unconstitutionally removed by Serbia in 1989. After Tito's death in 1980, the situation deteriorated, reaching its nadir in the 1998 genocide.
It is precisely this genocide which explains the uniqueness of Kosovo case. For more than a century, genocide and mass expulsions of Kosovo Albanians transformed Kosovo into a unique case. Albanians suffered extreme repression under the Milosevic regime. Some 12,000 civilians were killed, and 1.5 million Albanian civilians were displaced as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign of the Serbian Army in 1999. Around 3,000 are still missing.
Serbia has lost all legal and moral claim over Kosovo. When a state so discriminates against a national group under its rule, the right of that group to self-determination includes the right to secession. This idea is internationally recognized. The right of Kosovo to self-determination is not restricted to the right of internal, substantial autonomy inside Serbia. It is a right to secede from Serbia, a right to independence, as envisaged by the Ahtisaari Package. Kosovars cannot be forced to go back under the sovereignty of Serbia.
I deliberately use the term "Kosovo Albanians" because "Kosovo Muslims," as Glick calls them, has an underlying propaganda purpose. Why doesn't she refer to "The Serbia Orthodox"?
LET'S BE clear: There is no Islamist trend in the Albanian cause. It is a fundamental mistake to equate Religion with ethnicity.
While referencing Milosevic, Glick writes: "He stood accused of ethnically cleansing Kosovo of its Muslim population, which was perceived as innocent." Thus the genocide against Kosovo Albanians - the most documented event of its kind since WWII - is, for Glick, just a perception. This is beyond belief.
Regarding her claim that "Kosovo Muslims" are financed by Saudis, and their alleged connections to "global jihadists," this is false. No one in the democratic West will swallow this distorted version of the reality in Kosovo.
"Jihadist" and "irredentist" are simply loaded Serbian code-words. Kosovo is strongly supported by Washington, London, Paris and Rome. As Albania's prime minister, Dr. Sali Berisha, has stated: "Kosovo and Kosovars have chosen Brussels."
It is no coincidence that Kosovo was liberated by NATO, a powerful and democratic structure of states with an overwhelming Christian population.
THERE IS social cohesion and religious harmony in Kosovo. Today, the Speaker of the House, Kolë Berisha, is a Catholic. There is also a Christian Democratic Party now in the forefront of the struggle for independence in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians are more European than any other neighboring country in the Balkans. All surveys make clear that an overwhelming majority of the population supports NATO membership and EU integration.
Any discussion on the independent state of Kosovo should concentrate on the democratic nature of that state. Glick is mistaken when she urges the Olmert government to "immediately and loudly restate its opposition to the imposition of Kosovar independence on Serbia." Her logic of opposing the establishment of Muslim-only states should not apply in the case of Kosovo, because Kosovo is not and will not be a Muslim state.
Attempts to differentiate between the Albanians in Albania and the Albanians in Kosovo are wrong. There is, of course, sub-cultural diversity, as with all nations in the world, but Albanians on both sides of the border share the same culture, ethnicity, history, language, tradition, myths and legends.
The best answer, however, to all the speculations about Albania and the Albanians was given by your reporter Greer Fay Cashman in her Post report, "Sheltered from the Nazis in Albania" (November 4), which noted that Albania saved every one of its Jews during the Holocaust. And most of the Albanians who gave shelter to Jews during WWII were Muslims. Within the context of excellent relations existing between Albanians and Jews, there is no cause for inflammatory statements based on our religious heritage alone. The writer, a sociologist, is the new ambassador of the Republic of Albania to Israel.

[Arb]

Ja nje shkrim pro-Shkije i nje gazetari Britanik...

http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/st...214357,00.html

[Peja-Boy]

Putin njofton për kundërmasat ndaj zgjerimit të NATO-s


“Duke i shkelur marrëveshjet e arritura më parë, përgjatë kufirit tonë po rriten resurset ushtarake të shteteve të caktuara dhe vendeve anëtare të NATO-së, kurse propozimet ruse për, siç është rasti me krijimin e sistemit unik të mbrojtjes kundër-raketore me një qasje të barabartë në drejtimin e tyre të të gjithë pjesëmarrësve, tani për tani- për fat të keq- mbesin pa përgjigje”, ka thënë Putin, gjatë një takimi me kreun ushtarak rus.

Si një nga kundërmasat ruse ndaj NATO-së, Putin ka vënë moratoriumin për pjesëmarrjen e Rusisë në Marrëveshjen për Armatimin Konvencional në Evropë, suspendimi i së cilës nis, më 12 dhjetor, të këtij viti.

Putin ka thënë se Rusia do ta rris gjendjen e gatishmërisë luftarake të forcave të saj nukleare, “me qëllim që t’i jap përgjigje adekuate secilit agresor”.

[Arb]

Serbs can hurt independent Kosovo, not cripple it
By Ivana Sekularac and Fatos Bytyci

BELGRADE/PRISHTINA, Nov 28 (Reuters) - Serbia could apply hardball tactics if Kosova declares independence, making life harder, more expensive and frustrating for the landlocked province's 2 million people.

Talks between Belgrade and Kosova's ethnic Albanian majority ended in Austria on Wednesday with no agreement, and Serbia is drawing up an "action plan" for the period after Dec. 10, when mediators submit their conclusions to the United Nations.

Kosova Albanians say they will declare independence soon, probably in the next three months. U.S. envoy Frank Wisner urged both sides to keep their promise to avoid a slide to violence.

Serbian Defence Minister Dragan Sutanovac has repeatedly said there will be no military reaction. But Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica refuses to discuss other plans for what his deputy calls "the blackest scenario".

He will reject any declaration and, according to Serb media, may withdraw ambassadors from capitals that recognise Kosovo.

Serbia could refuse to recognise Kosovo passports, forcing travellers to make a big detour to get to Western Europe. It could cut off electricity supplies and block power supply routes. Kosovo buys 40 percent of its power from Serbia, the rest from Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania.

"Macedonia and Greece usually have power shortages so Kosovo gets electricity from Serbia or from Bulgaria -- but even then the transit route goes through Serbia," a Serb Energy Ministry official told Reuters.

But it would not make such a move lightly, mindful of its impact on Kosovo's Serb minority, marginalised and looking to Belgrade as the provider of basic services.

"If we cut off the power supply, we would be cutting it to the Serbs as well," the official said.

A source in one Serbian ministry said Serbia "could make life more difficult in Kosovo if it wanted".

"Goods from Serbia are the cheapest in Kosovo, so if Serbia for any reason blocks borders or stops supplying Kosovo it would make life in the province more expensive," the source said.

"Serbia wouldn't necessarily say it is closing the borders, but find a pretext, for example say Kosovo has foot and mouth."


EXAGGERATING POWER

But Kosovo officials say Serbia's moves are unlikely to have any long-term impact.

Reality reflects the eight years the province has spent out of Serbia's reach. Kosovo has been under U.N. rule since 1999, when NATO expelled Serb forces accused of killing civilians while fighting separatist rebels.

It has its own state administration -- part local, part U.N.-run -- and its citizens use midnight-blue "travel documents" issued by the U.N. mission, which are however not recognised by Serbia. Police, schools, and hospitals are all locally managed.

It has an independent water supply, gets mobile telephony services from Monaco, and routes commercial flights outside Serb airspace using NATO air control. Its only practical links with Serbia are in power, trade and road transport.

"If Serbia reacts, they won't only cause problems to Kosovo but Macedonia, Albania and Greece as well. Kosovo is a transit route for these countries," Nezir Sinani, spokesman for Kosovo's power company KEK.

Besim Beqaj from Kosovo's Chamber of Commerce says the Serbs are exaggerating their power. Imports and transit trade from Serbia account for around 15 percent of total trade, and most products come from the European Union and Macedonia.

"We've already thought of this and told our partners in the region what we import from Serbia. If Belgrade acts, they will bring the goods from other countries. There will be a momentary crisis but very soon everything will be normalised," he said. (Writing by Ellie Tzortzi)

[Arb]

Kosovo deserves its independence

I saw the terrible things the Serbians did; they proved themselves a cruel and unjust power

Anthony Loyd


Far beyond the borders of Serbia a sickening form of revisionism has prevailed across the years among critics of Kosovo's desire for independence. Some of it is born from a smug desire for controversy. Much of it comes from ignorance. A part of it derives from racism: inscrutable, impoverished, Muslim, their language and culture unlike any other in Europe, Kosovo Albanians are an easy “white nigger” target for the self-satisfied elements of Western Europe's pseudo-political classes.
The argument of the critics of Kosovan independence rests on two bogus tenets of denial. First, they state that Serbia was not responsible for the widescale massacre of Albanian civilians between 1998 and 1999, and propose instead that Serb security forces were somehow tricked into killing thousands of innocents by the provocation of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Secondly, they advance the theory that the 800,000 Albanian refugees who fled their homes during Nato's 79-day air campaign did so as they were frightened of the bombing rather than Serb military units.
Were these claims true then the fundamental case for Kosovo's independence, in the spotlight since the expiry on Monday of a UN deadline for Pristina and Belgrade to reach agreement on the province's future status, would be fatally flawed.
But they are untrue. I know this not as an assumption, but as a fact. I have many memories of Kosovo acquired during the time I spent reporting there between 1998 and 2000. Among the images of mass graves, burnt villages and swelling bodies that spring to mind is one of particular significance. In the fields outside the town of Istinic in southwestern Kosovo one summer day I watched some 40,000 Kosovans corralled together by rings of Serb police. The young, the old; man, woman, child, they stared in abject fear to the horizon where smoke from their villages, torched in a Serb purge from which they fled, gathered thickly in the skies. “Where is Europe? Where is America?” one refugee beseeched me.



After a day or two the Serb police pushed them back into the hinterland, driving them with stinging switches and robotic threats broadcast from tannoys mounted on the sides of armoured personnel carriers. These people had not fled from fear of Nato bombing.
The first Nato bomb was seven months away from falling. This was the summer of 1998. The world little cared for Kosovo then and in a dry run for their larger purge operations a year later the Serbs were already driving thousands of people from their homes.
The memory is pertinent to Kosovo's case for independence now as it revealed the absolute complicity of the Serbian authorities in human rights abuses in Kosovo and proved them then, as later, a cruel and unjust power from which the oppressed Kosovo Albanian majority thoroughly deserved to be independent.
The KLA were no angels. An everyman insurgent force (rather than a simple mafia entity as suggested by revisionists) comprising freedom fighters, intellectuals, peasants, nationalists, they also had a criminal element and their own human rights record was abysmal. But they reflected the majority population's desire for independence, a wish made credible, more than anything else, by the behaviour of the Serbian Government towards the civilian population.
As the international community wrings its hands over what to do with Kosovo now, it would do well to remember those facts. For time is no longer on anyone's side. Too much of it has already been wasted in vaccilation since 1999.
Earlier this year a resurgent Russia, keen to reinvigorate its influence on the region, torpedoed the UN's reasonable plan for supervised independence for Kosovo. A further five months of fruitless negotiation between Serbs and Kosovans followed before the December 10 deadline passed without result.
The current impasse seems solid. On one side Kosovo's newly elected Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, a former KLA member, is readying himself for a unilateral declaration of independence, backed by the US, Britain, France and most of the EU.
On the other Serbia's nationalist Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, backed by Russia, has made Kosovo's status as part of Serbia a lead issue in Serb politics and has given warning of dire consequences should the EU recognise Kosovan independence.
Doom merchants paint a grim picture in which Kosovo declares independence only to have it challenged by Serbia as being illegal without the imprimatur of the UN Security Council, in turn blocked by Russia. Violence subsequently flares in the province, then across the Balkans as Serbs in Bosnia and Albanians in Macedonia also demand independence. Presto: a new Balkan war made worse by a new cold war.
But the realities suggest otherwise. Mr Thaci knows he needs international recognition for independence and has already said that a declaration will be made in collaboration with the EU and US. He understands that a rash unilateral declaration would only deepen the economic malaise of a province totally reliant on outside financial assistance for survival.
Furthermore, for all the Kostunica hype in Serbia, most Serbs are far more concerned with their own economic woes than Kosovo's status, and may be reluctant to seek Russian patronage if it means worsening relations with the EU. Having fought and lost four wars in 16 years they are in no particular hurry for another conflict, and despite the sabre-rattling there has been no mobilisation of Yugoslav army units.
In Kosovo itself, due to the absence of any reconciliation between the two ethnic groups since 1999, the minority Serb population exists in enclaves largely removed from the Albanians. Low-level civil unrest, rioting and murder are possibilities, but with 16,000 Nato troops in the province it is unlikely that there can be any widescale clash of opposing paramilitaries.
So the road ahead may not be as perilous as it is feared. Wriggle room exists. However, in the meantime the EU should bolster its civilian and military missions in Kosovo, ensuring that the Serb minority is well protected. Though it would be ideal if a way forward could be found with Russian and Serb agreement, the EU should also accept that this is now unlikely to happen.
And when considering how to respond to the inevitable declaration of independence, the EU should also divest itself as best possible from the emotive language of regional players and revisionists alike and remember three simple facts. The Serbs effectively and irreversibly lost control of Kosovo in 1999. The majority of Kosovans want independence. And, above all, they deserve independence.

[Guri i madh]

Postimi origjinal është bërë nga Arb

Ja nje shkrim pro-Shkije i nje gazetari Britanik...

http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/st...214357,00.html

arb klikova në ket link po asgjë nuk morra vesh pos do jastaka me lpendra te gusave qata i qkyva

[Amina]

We deserve dhe Independence but they are making it very hard for us!
It is not fair!

[Arb]

Kosovo Struggles to Forge an Identity
PRISTINA, Kosovo — When Kosovo recently held a contest to design a flag, the organizers insisted that it reflect the multiethnic population, shunning the nationalist symbols of the past.
But dozens of artists ignored that edict. They submitted variants of the red and black Albanian flag, its two-headed eagle proudly displayed at weddings and on the battlefield for decades. The flag is reviled by many Serbs, who make up a minority in this breakaway Serbian province.
As Kosovo prepares to declare independence — the culmination of a long and bloody struggle — this artistic rebellion underlines the challenge this small territory faces to forge a secular national identity, one that can overcome ethnic and religious resentments.
Hashim Thaci, the incoming Kosovo prime minister who was the leader of the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army, expressed the view of many Kosovars when he recently said, “A Kosovo identity does not exist.” But that is starting to change.
“How we create a Kosovar identity is a critical question,” said Migjen Kelmendi, a former rock star who is now a linguist and editor. Mr. Kelmendi is leading the effort to fashion a new self-image for Kosovo. The Albanian Muslims who form a large majority of Kosovo, he said, “think of themselves in terms of their Albanian ethnicity, and they think that questioning that makes them a traitor.”
An important date for Kosovo passed on Dec. 10, the deadline for negotiations to end on the province’s status. Mediators from the European Union, Moscow and Washington reported to the United Nations that the negotiations had failed. Expectations are that in due time, Kosovo will simply declare independence.
In anticipation, symbols have been cropping up. Fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army have peppered the province with giant monuments and statues glorifying K.L.A. soldiers and guerrillas, idealized fighters resembling James Dean, who wield AK-47 assault rifles and stare down at passers-by on Pristina’s main boulevards. The United States is similarly glorified, with a statue of Bill Clinton in the works and a replica of the Statue of Liberty atop the Victory Hotel.
Intellectuals and political analysts argue that this rebranding of Kosovo inevitably trips over history. Albin Kurti, an ethnic Albanian activist who is under house arrest, contends that Kosovar Albanians are wedded to their Albanian identity because they have long defined themselves by the ethnicity for which they were persecuted during decades of authoritarian regimes.
“Our nationalism is a reaction to oppression by Milosevic and war with the Serbs,” Mr. Kurti said, referring to Slobodan Milosevic, former president of Yugoslavia, who in 1989 ended Kosovo’s autonomous status and dismissed 130,000 ethnic Albanians from their jobs. The subsequent repression of the Kosovo Albanians eventually brought Western sanctions on the Milosevic government and an American-led NATO bombing campaign.
The attempt to forge a new identity also resurrects memories of the Communist period after World War II when Tito tried to stifle ethnic Albanian identity as part of his project to subsume ethnic divisions across Yugoslavia. Instead, Tito’s effort had the opposite effect. He also inadvertently fostered a movement among Kosovar Albanians for the reunification of Kosovo with neighboring Albania — an aim since abandoned in favor of independence from Serbia.
Yet a new identity is needed if Kosovo is to provide for a multiethnic state with a segregated Serbian minority and reduce the divisions that have often led to war, a variety of leaders say.
Agim Ceku, Kosovo’s outgoing prime minister, argued in an interview that Kosovo must create a secular nation and draft a constitution like America’s that recognizes the rights of all citizens. Shortly after becoming prime minister, he was criticized by some Albanian nationalists for asking Kosovo’s Serbs to help build the new Kosovo.
The effort to build a civic society was initially championed by Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovo’s first president. Mr. Rugova, an ardent secularist, tried to create a national cuisine by serving Kosovar dishes like ice milk and salty cheese. He even tried to rename the Sharr Shepherd, a dog indigenous to Kosovo, as the Kosovo Shepherd. Such was the resistance to his project that when he proposed a new flag in 2000, known as the flag of Dardania — the ancient word for Kosovo — some burned it in protest.
During the cold war, Mr. Kelmendi recalled, Albanians in Kosovo dreamed of reuniting with Albania, which was under a dictatorship and isolated from the rest of Europe. But he said when Kosovar Albanians visited Albania, they saw an impoverished people with whom they had little in common.
“My father had told me about Albania as if it were a fairy tale homeland,” he said, but when he visited, “all I saw was a nightmare.”
Historians are also part of the effort to remold Kosovo. Jahja Dranqolli, a prominent ethnic Albanian historian, said it was time to rewrite Kosovo’s history, which he said had been whitewashed by foreign rulers.
“We were always part of Yugoslavia or Albania or Serbia,” he said. “We have always been living in a shadow world from which we need to escape.”
The ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, who are 95 percent Muslim, could look to their Muslim roots for identity, as some did after the war of the 1990s, when several local imams went to study in Saudi Arabia, and returned preaching Islamic nationalism.
But Shkelzen Maliqi, a leading political analyst and intellectual, argues that Kosovars are far more likely to embrace pro-Americanism. He said that most Albanians were secular, products of a history in which Turks forced mass conversion to Islam upon Christians. The only Islamic party in Kosovo garnered just 2 percent of votes in recent elections. “The national liberation movement against Serbia was always careful to play down Islam and to be pro-Western,” he said.
While the debate about a national identity is taking off, Mr. Kelmendi said it clearly had a long way to go: “When you ask a Kosovar, ‘Are you a Kosovar?’ they will answer, ‘No, I am Albanian.’ If you ask a Serb, ‘Are you a Kosovar?’ they will answer, ‘No, I am a Serb.’”

[Arb]

Kosova's final chapter is still to be written

By Chris Patten
Published: December 17 2007 02:00 | Last updated: December 17 2007 02:00

If the recent wave of commentary on Tony Blair's foreign policy record had to be distilled to a few words, they would be "Kosova good, Iraq bad". For once, the sound-bite is not far from the truth: long before his disastrous venture in the Middle East, Mr Blair did indeed make the right decision to intervene forcefully when Belgrade was ethnically cleansing its southernmost province of its Albanian majority.
What the discussion of the Blair decade generally missed, however, is that the Kosova story is far from over. Today's Pristina may not be like Basra or Baghdad, but its current calm belies the province's underlying instability.
Since 1999, Kosova has been a United Nations protectorate, technically part of Serbia even though Belgrade has no institutions or influence on the ground. With efforts to formalise Kosova's status under discussion at the UN Security Council, the fear is that the longer diplomats delay, the more likely local frustration will turn to bloodshed.
After more than a year of trying to get Belgrade and Pristina to negotiate a settlement on Kosova's final status, the UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari concluded that neither side was going to change its position on the fundamental issue of status. Belgrade is determined to reassert Serbian sovereignty over Kosova and the Kosovars will never give up their independence demands. A compromise solution is impossible.
So Mr Ahtisaari submitted a comprehensive proposal to the Security Council in March. The council is considering a draft resolution that would endorse Mr Ahtisaari's proposal and open the path towards independence.
That clearly riles the Serbs - as well as their self-declared protector in Moscow, which is threatening a Security Council veto - but the move cannot be a surprise to anyone who has followed events in the region. As a European commissioner, I visited Kosova about 10 times after the 1999 war and it was always obvious that independence was the only sustainable outcome.
First, the historic context that makes Kosova a special case. In 1989, it became the first victim of the aggressive nationalism pursued by Slobodan Milosevic when its far-reaching autonomy within Serbia was abolished.
Kosovars were subject to systematic oppression.
A small Serbian minority - less than 10 per cent - ruled over the majority of Albanian Kosovars.
Moreover, with the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation Kosova lost its status as a federal entity, similar (though not equal) to those of the six Yugoslav republics. After years of the peaceful pursuit of independence, Kosovars turned to armed struggle and in 1999 Mr Milosevic launched a massive military operation, including the ethnic cleansing that sparked the international community's intervention.
Expecting Kosova's 90 per cent Albanian population to be ruled from Belgrade again after all that has occurred would be a recipe for renewed violence. This is why the members of the contact group - France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and the US - formally stated more than a year ago that final status must be acceptable to the people of Kosova.
The truth is, there is no viable alternative to the UN special envoy's proposal. Despite their reluctance to get behind the current Security Council draft, even the Russians have not put forward any competing proposal.
Mr Ahtisaari's plan and the draft resolution will probably never please Belgrade, but they do contain strong elements of compromise.
There would be limitations to independent Kosova's sovereignty, such as restrictions on the future defence force and international civilian and military presence that would supervise the early years of independence. For the Serb minority, there are extensive provisions concerning local self-government and the protection of religious heritage, creating conditions that would allow Serbs to remain and for those who have left to return. Nowhere do minorities enjoy such far-reaching rights.
The European Union has a special interest because if Kosova goes wrong, Europe will be first to suffer. Also, the EU has agreed to carry the main burden of backing Kosova both economically and by providing personnel for the military and civilian missions post-independence.
EU members on the Security Council need to push through the resolution with all their diplomatic might. The Kosova story cannot be added to the international community's success column yet. Mr Ahtisaari's final chapter needs to be added.

Lord Patten of Barnes is the former European commissioner for external relations and is chairman of the board of the International Crisis Group