Diplomacia Nderkombetare per Kosoven

[Reana]

"Kosovo: Get It Right, Now "
John Norris in Le Monde Diplomatique
12 October 2005
Le Monde Diplomatique
The soon-to-be-appointed UN special envoy who will negotiate over the status of Kosovo faces an almost impossible task: to satisfy all those with a stake in the region without denying minority rights, and to prevent the region from being frozen in stalemate for decades.

Soon the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, will appoint a special envoy to begin difficult negotiations over Kosovo’s final status. This post will probably go to a respected senior European diplomat, probably the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, with as many as three deputies, including an American, a European and a Russian. But as the international community has learned from repeated rounds of high-stakes diplomacy in the Balkans over the past 15 years, some successful and some decidedly not, a lot more than good intentions goes into getting the talks right.

The stakes are high. If the new envoy does not get Kosovo right, it could become perpetually underdeveloped and prone to unrest, or stay frozen in a decades-long stalemate like Cyprus. Equally important (and despite the fact that Kosovo is unusual because of the 1999 Nato military intervention that paved the way for this current process), the international community’s handling of Kosovo will be read around the globe as having broader meaning for what it says about minority rights, self-determination and the way to deal with breakaway territories. So here is some unsolicited advice for the new special envoy.

If you don’t have real authority, your mission will fail. After a few rounds of shuttle diplomacy between Pristina, Belgrade, Moscow and points west, don’t be surprised if you hit an impasse. At this point, you will need to have the power to put new proposals on the table to get the talks moving. Leaders in this region have seen a string of high-level envoys come and go who did not have the standing to take strong action.

Obviously, you will need to respect the bottom lines that will be deal-breakers for the Contact Group, but if the Serbs, Albanians and Russians see you as little more than a letter carrier from Washington and London, it will not be long before they start dealing directly with these capitals and turning you into a mere figurehead. This is important, because this is one of the first occasions (since Lord Owen’s rocky involvement in the early phases of the Bosnian war) that a European has been given such pre-eminence in Balkans diplomacy. Unless you have real powers, many in the Balkans will assume that you are simply answering to your US deputy or more powerful handlers in the White House. It will only take a few times when you need to step out of the room to get instructions before others around the table begin to think they should be negotiating directly with the front office.

In a marked shift from its position in its first term, the Bush administration is now much more willing to take on the Kosovo issue, and feels that there is no realistic alternative to moving forward with resolving Kosovo’s status. The core team of career US diplomats dealing with the issue are seasoned Balkans hands and quite able. That said, it is far from clear how the Bush administration, which never seems to like being the junior partner in anything, will adjust to letting Europe take the lead on Kosovo. Washington has enough on its hands right now, with everything from Iraq to New Orleans crowding for attention, and it should be happy that Europe has taken greater ownership of all issues Balkan. Yet, there also continues to be an almost instinctive dislike within the White House for European leadership on matters of high diplomacy, and a fundamental distrust of Europe’s ability to stick to tough positions.

The key to dealing with the administration will be to get their full buy-in early, maintain good rapport with your US deputy and convey a sense of professionalism and forward movement that avoids grandstanding. You will also need to maintain a good relationship with the US military officials involved in planning discussions, because most people in the Balkans still see the US military as the most important muscle behind any agreement, even if its long-term presence in the region remains relatively token.

Dealing with Russia is both vital and uniquely frustrating. You will need to endure many long nights and much second-hand smoke before you get Moscow’s UN security council stamp of approval for any Kosovo deal, regardless of whether you have a Russian deputy or not. There are many Soviet-trained hardliners still in positions of real power in the Kremlin, and most still view Kosovo as yet another loss for Russia’s broad sphere of influence. But image remains important for the Russians. President Putin is eager to be seen as a heavyweight on the global stage, and he uses such appearances to bolster his sometimes shaky domestic credibility. Your meetings with the Russians should be well publicised and frequent. You would be wise to speak of the Russians as tough negotiators who care deeply about the minority rights of the Serbs, and you should offer Moscow iron-clad guarantees that the West will not accept the creation of a Greater Albania that merges Kosovo and Albania. Whatever new status awaits Kosovo, it is vital that this arrangement not trigger further rounds of irredentism and territorial claims; allowing Kosovo to merge with Albania would only destabilise Macedonia and other states in the region already wrestling with their own ethnic problems.

Russia has learned the hard way that being obstructionist in the Balkans is counterproductive, but it is important to remember that the Russians also fear that any precedent established in Kosovo will eventually be applied to Chechnya. Russia has a large and restive Muslim population in its southern republics, and would be wise to learn the lesson that Serbia failed to grasp in Kosovo: protecting minority rights is the surest means to head off insurrections before they begin.

The key to dealing with the Serbian government will be applying steady public pressure and using your position as a bully pulpit while dealing with Belgrade’s legitimate concerns. Kosovo remains a hot issue in Serbian politics, and few Serbian politicians have been honest to their constituents about the general situation on the ground in Kosovo over the past 15 years. Many Serbian politicians acknowledge behind closed doors that it would be easier for them if it looked like their arms were being twisted by the international community. The general sentiment is “Please impose this rather than make us look like the bad guys in public”. Yet, this effort cannot be totally heavy-handed; as one senior US official noted, it will be important to “not totally drive the Serbs against the wall. If we drive the Serbs into a corner they will not bend.” It is probably better to err on the side of toughness; some of the Serbian officials involved in the talks have been through many similar exercises during the past decade and will be anything but starstruck at your title or the importance of your mission.

Figuring out practical plans to respect minority Serbian rights in Kosovo is the best way to take the wind out of the sails of Serbian complaints. Kosovo is the site of important historic and religious sites for the Serbs, and access to and protection of religious sites will be a central concern. It might also be useful to locate some government ministries in the heavily Serbian city of Mitrovica, and establishing security arrangements that can be trusted to protect Serbs will be a central measure of your credibility. The issue of decentralising government powers in Kosovo will also loom large, but while decentralisation is fine, attempts to partition Kosovo are not. Lastly, the French “non” vote on the EU constitution will only make your job harder, and the loss of potential early EU membership for Serbia has left the international community with one less carrot to dangle before Belgrade.

Dealing with the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team will be a mess. Getting unity even within the team will be tricky business, and a senior diplomat in Pristina recently complained that the current provisional government of Kosovo spends most of its time “trying to appear to be doing something without actually doing anything”. The recent announcement that President Ibrahim Rugova is suffering from cancer will only intensify the jockeying among the Albanians for political position, and these party disputes have often veered into violence in the past. Making sure that former Kosovo Liberation Army fighters understand that violence is counterproductive and has no place in the political arena will be key to bringing some harmony to the Kosovar Albanian delegation.

While the Kosovar Albanians will likely get much of what they want out of talks, in that they are unlikely ever to be ruled directly by Belgrade again, do not expect them to go along happily with the process. You will need to be every bit as blunt with the Albanians as you are with the Serbs. Probably the best thing you can do for Kosovo and Kosovars is to develop a reasonable plan for the continued international civilian presence in Kosovo over time. Kosovo is still plagued by cronyism and corruption, with little experience in running government. By pushing the Kosovars to accept the role of a reasonably intrusive continued international civilian presence, particularly in areas such as the justice system, you can help avoid creating a Kosovo that is ripe for failure.

As the world has learned painfully in the Balkans, just because everyone agrees to a plan does not mean that it is necessarily a good plan. One need only think back to the creation of safe havens and the fiasco of Srebrenica to appreciate that fact. There will be times when all of the capitals with which you are dealing are so eager to reach a deal that they will sign almost anything. The devil is in the detail and if you do not resist the many half-baked sovereignty options with which you will be presented, Europe could be left with Kosovo as a problem for decades to come.

Even the EU itself has recognised that Kosovo will need to have such fundamentals as treaty-making powers and distinct borders if it is ever to be integrated into the EU and other European institutions years down the road, and this is likely its best hope looking forward.

Welcome to your new job.

John Norris is the Washington Chief of Staff for the International Crisis Group and author of Collision Course: NATO, Russia and Kosovo.

[Reana]

Martti Ahtisaari, eshte kryesues Emeritus, i ICG (International Crisis Group), organizate kjo e cila ne menyre konsistente ka bere lobi per pavaresine e Kosoves, dhe ka kritikuar punen e te gjitha institucioneve te huaja dhe vendore per zvarritjen e proceseve demokratike ne pavaresimin e Kosoves!

Arsyeja kryesore e kundershtimit Serb, per te pranuar Ahtisaarin si kryesues te bisedimeve Kosove-Serbi, ka te beje me pozicionimin e vete Ahtisaarit i cili eshte perkrahes i fuqishem i pavaresise se Kosoves; por Bashkesia Nderkomebtare ia ka bere te ditur Serbise se nuk eshte ne pozicion per ti caktuar kushte askujt!

ICG eshte organizate e cila ne kuader te saj, grumbullon numer te konsideruesehm diplomatesh perendimore, kongresmene e senatore Amerikane, dhe ka sfere veprimi te gjere, ne shume shtete e regjione te Botes.

Pak me shume per organizimin e ICG-se dhe per punen dhe raportet e tyre per Kosoven, ne linkun ne vazhdim:
(http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1139&l=1)

[Reana]

AMSTERDAM (Reuters) - The Hague war crimes tribunal acquitted two former rebel Kosovo Albanians of war crimes on Wednesday, one of them -- Fatmir Limaj -- a key figure in the Kosovo Liberation Army, but jailed a third for 13 years.


The acquittals in the tribunal's first judgment on war crimes in Kosovo during the 1998-99 fighting between Serbian forces and the rebel KLA, were greeted with celebrations on the streets of Pristina, the provincial capital.

Limaj, 34, was a senior figure in the KLA and a key ally of ex-KLA commander Hashim Thaci in his Democratic Party of Kosovo, now the main opposition party in the province.

"This is great news," senior government minister Ardian Gjini said of Limaj's release. "Most importantly the court proved that the KLA did not commit systematic crimes against civilians as Serbian forces did," he told Reuters.

Acquitted alongside Limaj was Isak Musliu, also a former member of the now disbanded KLA. The court found Haradin Bala guilty of murder, torture and cruel treatment and sentenced him to 13 years in prison.

The arrest of the three former rebels in early 2003 sparked protests among Kosovo's majority Albanians, who see them as freedom fighters against Serb rule. Violence was feared in Kosovo in the event of guilty verdicts.

Presiding judge Kevin Parker said the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Limaj had any role in a prison camp in Lapusnik or that he was criminally responsible for the offences with which he was charged.

There was also little evidence that Musliu, 35, a former KLA guard, had any kind of involvement in the camp, Parker said.

But Parker said the prosecution had proved that Bala, 48, participated in the murder of nine prisoners outside the camp in the Berisa mountains.

He was also found guilty of mistreating three prisoners and aiding in the mistreatment and torture of another prisoner.

[Reana]

UN tribunal jails Kosovo Albanian
BBC News

Thousands marched in Kosovo in support of the three accused men
A UN court in The Hague has jailed the first Kosovo Albanian to be convicted of war crimes committed during the conflict with Serbian forces in 1998.
Haradin Bala received a 13-year jail term for torture and murder at a prison camp run by the Kosovo Liberation Army.

His alleged commander, Fatmir Limaj, and co-accused Isak Musliu were cleared of all charges and ordered to be freed.

The UN court was set up to try war crimes and crimes against humanity from the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

Several Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims have already been jailed by the court.

Serbian politicians have often accused the tribunal of failing to properly prosecute alleged war crimes by Kosovo Albanians.

Mr Limaj, Mr Musliu and Haradin Bala were the first Kosovo Albanians to be indicted.

Thousands of people marched through the streets of Kosovo's capital, Pristina, this week to proclaim the innocence of the three.

Protests first erupted after the men were arrested in early 2003 and there were fears guilty verdicts would spark fresh unrest in Kosovo.

Executing prisoners

Prosecutors had accused the three men of detaining 35 people - including Serbs and alleged Albanian collaborators - in the camp, where they were subjected to torture and inhumane conditions.


Kosovo Albanian guerrillas battled Serbian forces until Nato intervened

The three were also accused of executing several prisoners as they fled a Serb assault on the Lapusnik region.

The presiding judge, Kevin Parker, said the prosecution had successfully proven the existence of a prison camp at Lapusnik, near Pristina.

The judge said Bala's presence at the camp had been proven beyond any doubt, but there was not enough evidence to link Mr Limaj and Mr Musliu to the crimes committed there.

[Reana]

Profile: Ibrahim Rugova
Ibrahim Rugova has spent more than 15 years at the centre of Kosovan politics, pushing to establish the province as a democratic, sovereign state independent of Serbia.

BBC News

Mr Rugova was born in western Kosovo in 1944, the son of a shopkeeper who was executed after World War II by the advancing Yugoslav Communists.

Nevertheless the son prospered, going on to study linguistics at the Sorbonne in Paris, before becoming a writer and professor of Albanian literature.


Ethnic tension boiled over in divided Mitrovica in 2004
He boasts a passion for poetry, mineral rock samples and Sar mountain dogs from the southern Kosovo border area. Rarely seen without a trademark silk scarf, he cuts a distinctive figure.

He was drawn into politics in 1989 after being elected as head of the Kosovo Writers' Union, which became a breeding ground for opposition to the Serbian authorities.

This activism hardened after Belgrade stripped Kosovo of its autonomy later that year, and led to the establishment of Mr Rugova's LDK.

Throughout the 1990s Mr Rugova was seen as the moderate, intellectual face of Albanian opposition to Slobodan Milosevic's Belgrade regime.

His ambivalent attitude and eventual political support for the Albanian guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) went largely unquestioned as support grew in the West for military action against Serbia's brutal rule in Kosovo.

But his involuntary appearance alongside Mr Milosevic at the height of the conflict virtually ruined his reputation in Kosovo. Many felt the man who for years had called for Western intervention was now urging Nato to stop the bombing.

Most Albanians were furious, with some accusing him of treason. When the Serb authorities allowed him out of house arrest during the conflict Mr Rugova left the Balkans for Italy, his political career apparently over.

Back in charge

But the man sometimes known as "the Gandhi of the Balkans" returned home and used his experience and pedigree as a proponent of Kosovan nationalism to win the presidency in 2002.


Long before the KLA arrived on the scene in the mid 1990s, Mr Rugova led the parallel government which the Albanians declared at the start of Mr Milosevic's brutal crackdown.

The LDK was as much a party as a popular social movement. He built the loyalty and trust of the people, which lasted the course.

Ibrahim Rugova campaigned on a pledge to push ahead with demands for full independence from Serbia; members of Kosovo's legislative assembly believed him and voted him into office.

Just a day after the vote, Mr Rugova declared that his first priority as the leader of the victorious party would be to press as fast as possible for sovereignty, and then attend to the economic reconstruction of a province still shattered by war.

He duelled with Mr Milosevic, his old enemy, when called to the stand during the former Yugoslav president's war crimes trial in The Hague.

His home and car have been attacked by bombers, although he has escaped unharmed from each assault.

Despite all his efforts, though, the future of Kosovo is not yet clear.

[Reana]

EU appears split on Kosovo
Nov. 29, 2005 at 9:34PM
Washington Post


European Union states appear divided on the future of Kosovo as negotiations begin on its status.
The EU's common position is that Kosovo must not be partitioned, the rights of its Serbian minority must be respected and the pre-1999 status of direct rule from Belgrade is not acceptable. But last week, Czech Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek suggested an ethnic partition might be the best solution, the EU Observer reported.
At the same time, Spain, Greece and Italy appear reluctant to push for an independent Kosovo. In Spain's case, officials are reluctant to give its own Basque minority ideas, while Greece and Italy have close economic ties with Serbia.
Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, functioning as a U.N. special envoy, has just begun talks with Serbian and Kosovar Albanian represen

[krijuesiii]

...perkthej moj qike te marrum vesh dicka...



tungiii

[Reana]

AP
15 Companies Put Up for Sale in Kosovo
Wednesday November 30, 11:52 am ET
Fifteen Companies Put Up for Sale in Kosovo in Hopes of Boosting the Economy


PRISTINA, Serbia-Montenegro (AP) -- Kosovo's sunflower oil producer, a brick maker, a pipe factory and two hotels were among 15 state firms put up for sale Wednesday in hopes of boosting the economy in the disputed province.


The Kosovo Trust Agency launched the 11th round of privatization in an effort to sell the companies, which were once owned by their workers and managers under a system set up during communist-era Yugoslavia.

The privatization agency, which has advertised the companies on its Web site, is hoping 16 new firms will be created when the sales are completed.

Privatization is among the most sensitive issues in Kosovo, which was placed under U.N. administration in 1999 following NATO air strikes that ended a Serb crackdown on independence-seeking ethnic Albanians.

The process of privatization in Kosovo is complex in part because it is unclear whether Kosovo will become independent or remain part of Serbia-Montenegro, the successor state of Yugoslavia. Serbia's authorities have fiercely opposed the privatizations.

The Kosovo Trust Agency, the U.N. entity responsible for privatizing the enterprises and putting them on solid legal footing, wants private entrepreneurs to assume the risk of modernizing the industries.

The companies are considered inefficient and dilapidated after years of neglect.

Kosovo Trust Agency: http://www.kta-kosovo.org

[Reana]

Komenti ne kuader te "International Herald Tribune" mbi shkrimin e Hashim Thaqit "Populli im e meriton pavaresine":

The status of Kosovo
International Herald Tribune

Hashim Thaci argues that Albanians in Kosovo are entitled to independence from Serbia ("My people deserve their independence," Views, Nov. 26).

Thaci's main argument for independence is that his Albanian people have suffered so much. But while Slobodan Milosevic's policies were indeed ruthless and indefensible, Thaci's historical account lacks vital elements of Albanian nationalism and separatism, including the fact that Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo have suffered over the last six years.

Thaci claims that minorities will be protected in an independent Kosovo. But the percentage of Serbs left in Kosovo has dropped dramatically in recent decades - including the nearly 200,000 Serbs who left the province in the wake of the 1999 war. Thaci was a leading politician at the time. In contrast, Serbia has remained multi-ethnic. The "old nationalism" that Thaci blames on the Belgrade of today is not exactly eradicated in today's Kosovo.

The world has about 200 countries and thousands upon thousands of ethnic groups. Should we have thousands of new countries, one for each ethnic group? Thaci mentions Serbian war criminals, but there are indicted Kosovo-Albanian war criminals too.

Thaci would like Kosovo to join the European Union with protection from NATO as part of a demilitarized area. The idea of demilitarization is news to us.

Hashim Thaci had the nom de guerre Snake. That, in itself, is very telling.

Thaci, a former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which was once branded a terrorist group by the U.S. government, has now apparently morphed into a sage purveyor of advice via your prestigious newspaper. So, what is behind this sudden transformation?

It is more than obvious that the ongoing terror tactics against the Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo, perpetrated first by the KLA and then by its successor criminal offshoots, continues to be ignored and disguised by the West's mainstream media and politicians. Why? Because, they have no other way to justify NATO's aggression on Yugoslavia in 1999.

If Thaci's people have "earned" sovereignty, then the criteria for independence are murder, mayhem and barbarism. Is Europe ready and willing to embrace an intolerant and terrorist-supported Islamic state in its underbelly?

(Jan Oberg, Lund, Sweden, Aleksandar Mitic, Brussels)

[Reana]

Lajmet e Agjencise se lajmeve Kineze Xinhuanet, raportojne per reagimet e Qeverise se Serbise kunder UNMIK-ut per dorezimin e kompetencave/krijimin te dy Ministrive te reja ne Kosove


Serbia criticizes UN mission decision to create ministries in Kosovo
www.chinaview.cn 2005-12-22 05:19:13

BELGRADE, Dec. 21 (Xinhuanet) -- The Serbian negotiating team for Kosovo's future status criticized on Wednesday a decision by the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to create ministries of justice and interior in the Serbian province.

The team, led by Serbian top leaders, said in a statement that the transfer of UNMIK's authorities in the field of internal affairs and judiciary to Kosovo's provisional institutions was a hasty and dangerous political move.

"If this really happened, all efforts of the international community and authorities in Belgrade to create an atmosphere of trust and goodwill by opening political talks on the future status of Kosovo would be threatened," the statement said.

Kosovo, a Serbian pro-independence province, has been administered by the United Nations since mid-1999. The direct talks on its future status between Kosovo's Albanian majority and Serbian authorities are expected to be held in early next year under the auspices of UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari.

The UNMIK on Tuesday officially approved the creation of a ministry of justice, a ministry of the interior, and a judiciary council in Kosovo, as the first phase in the transfer of powers from UNMIK to interim institutions of Kosovo in the judiciary and police sectors.

The Serbian negotiating team said the UNMIK's decision violated item No. 39 of a report of Kai Eide, UN special envoy for the implementation of standards in Kosovo, which clearly warned of numerous negative consequences of the possible transfer of authority from police and the judiciary to Kosovo's provisional institutions.

The team called upon the UNMIK to review the decision, since it "threatened the Serb and all other non-Albanian communities in the province and directly hampers the political talks on the future status of Kosovo."

[Reana]

Raporti i Reuters-it mbi reagimet e Serbise, ndaj ketyre dy Ministrive ne kuader te Qeverise se Kosoves


Serbia says new Kosovo ministries "dangerous" move

BELGRADE, Dec 21 (Reuters) - Serbia on Wednesday said it was a "reckless and dangerous political move" to transfer the authority of the police and justice sectors to the ethnic Albanian dominated population of its Kosovo province.

On Tuesday the United Nations, which took over the administration of Kosovo in 1999 after NATO bombing forced Serb forces to pull out, formally established ministries in the two sensitive sectors which had so far been in U.N. hands.

Serbia said the move came at a very bad time when the Serb and Kosovo Albanian sides were starting U.N.-mediated talks on whether the province becomes independent, as the majority Albanians demand or stays part of Serbia, as it now formally is.

"At the very start of talks on the future status of Kosovo such moves only go in favour of the extremist policy of the Albanian leadership in the province," the government's team for Kosovo talks said in a statement.

The government urged Kosovo's U.N. governor Soren Jessen-Petersen to reconsider his decision which "jeopardises Serb and other non-Albanian communities in the province and directly burdens political talks on Kosovo's future status."

The U.N. officials say the justice and police ministries, which will assume their responsibilities gradually will be subject to a "vigorous accountability policy" and the U.N. governor will have the right to intervene.

The 90-percent ethnic Albanian majority is increasingly impatient for independence, but Serbia says this is impossible and has offered the province wide autonomy.

Last month, U.N. envoy Martti Ahtisaari started shuttle diplomacy aimed at reconciling the two opposing visions. A decision on whether Kosovo will get the independence the Albanians demand is expected in the second half of next year.

The two sides are expected to meet face-to-face in the second half of January, probably in Vienna where Ahtisaari has set up his headquarters.

[Reana]

Raporti i Marti Ahtisarit ne favor te pavaresise se Kosoves


Kosovo could one day be self-sufficient - UN envoy

Kosovo could one day be self-sufficient - UN envoy
Tue Dec 20, 2005 10:44 PM GMT

By Irwin Arieff

UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - Kosovo has enough natural resources, including low-grade coal, to one day make it economically self-sufficient, the United Nations mediator for the disputed Serb province said on Tuesday.

Veteran diplomat Martti Ahtisaari, who is leading U.N. talks aimed at determining whether Kosovo gains independence or remains a part of Serbia, said economic development would be a top priority in the negotiations.

Kosovo is heavily subsidised by international donors, and "when the international community knows that there are natural resources which are not exploited, you can't expect the world's taxpayers to finance this forever," Ahtisaari told reporters at U.N. headquarters.

"Everyone wants to create conditions in which these can be properly exploited," he said.

If that happens "I think there is in the future the possibility for sustainable economic development in Kosovo," he said when asked whether it could ever support itself economically.

While still legally part of Serbia, Kosovo has been under U.N. administration since mid-1999, when Serbian forces were driven out to stop what the West said was their persecution of ethnic Albanians during an uprising by Albanian guerrillas.

The province's 2 million Albanians -- 90 percent of the population -- are demanding independence.

Serbs, however, see the mountain-ringed province with its scores of centuries-old Orthodox religious sites as the cradle of their nation and insist it remain a part of Serbia.

Ahtisaari said the World Bank believes that among Kosovo's natural resources were supplies of lignite that would last 50 to 75 years. Lignite is a low-grade form of coal that is used mainly to create steam for power generation.

To exploit the lignite will require significant international help. But when used to generate power, "it will be extremely useful for the economy of Kosovo and also for the provision of energy in the region in general," Ahtisaari said.

[pokeri]

DUHET BERE MBULIMIN E MESHKUJVE POSAQERISHT FYTYRAVE TE TYRE, MEQE PA LAKMINE E TYRE PER DCO GJE QE I RRETHON, KJO BOTE DO TE ISHTE NE PAQE PERPETUALE!!!

Ore, para se ta bësh këtë, na i përkthe ata artikuj
se si t'i kuptojmë ne????...

[Reana]

Artikull i publikuar nga analisti dhe politikani Tim Judah per prapaskenen e politikes nderkombetare mbi zgjidhjen e statusit te ardhshem te Kosoves.Tim Judah eshte poashtu autor i librave "Kosova: Lufta dhe hakmarrja e Serbeve" si dhe "Historia, mitet dhe shakterrimi i Jugosllavise"


Kosovo: behind-the-scenes hard talk begins

As both formal and informal behind-the-scenes talks about Kosovo’s future status begin, the member countries of the powerful Contact Group seem to have reached a consensus that Kosovo should be granted “conditional independence”.

(By Tim Judah in London and Paris for ISN Security Watch (24/12/05))

Though UN officials have recently announced that talks concerning the status of Serbia’s UN-administered province of Kosovo would begin in earnest in January, ISN Security Watch has learned that much of the real work is already being done behind the scenes, with intense discussions between key countries involved in the region and Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders.


Over the past few weeks, a series of meetings, both formal and informal, have taken place in key capitals - including the Serbian capital, Belgrade, and the Kosovo capital, Pristina - as diplomats attempt to shape a deal for Kosovo, bolstering the work being done by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, who has been chosen to head the UN-led status negotiations.

Since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, the province of some two million people has been under the jurisdiction of the UN, though it legally remains a part of Serbia. Its population is over 90 per cent ethnic Albanian. They have made it clear they want nothing less than full independence for Kosovo.

Serbia’s official position is that Kosovo can have “more than autonomy but less than independence”.

Members of the Serbian negotiation team, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and President Boris Tadic, had proposed earlier this month that Kosovo be divided into Albanian and Serbian areas.

According to the Serbian plan, the Albanian areas would be self-governing and independent in all but name, while the Serbian ones would remain linked to Belgrade and the Serbian flag would fly once again on Kosovo’s frontiers.

In parallel to this, the Serbian leadership has also decided that it would be most advantageous to argue their Kosovo case along legal lines - that is to say that Kosovo is de jure part of Serbia and thus its international frontiers cannot be changed without Serbia’s consent.

However, Kosovo’s Albanian leaders are demanding that the province be given full independence in recognition of their right to self-determination.

Over the last few weeks, there have been several meetings - including one between the Contact Group, which was set up to coordinate policy during the Balkan wars in the early 1990s, and Ahtisaari - which have yielded significant results. While Ahtisaari is now the official Kosovo mediator, real power lies with the countries of the Contact Group.

There appears to be a considerable unity of purpose among the Contact Group members. France and the US, for example, so often at loggerheads over the past few years, have no major disagreement over Kosovo. Russia, too, has been described by diplomats as extremely cooperative over Kosovo. If Serbian leaders were hoping to find backing from the traditionally friendly Russians there is no evidence thus far that they will get it.

Representatives of the Contact Group countries have decided that the best solution for Kosovo is that it be given so called “conditional independence”.

This means that the sovereign link with Serbia will be broken but that restrictions on Kosovo’s independence will remain for a transitional period. These could include, for example, no army and awarding reserve powers to a representative of the international community. The result would be a slimmed down and more focused version of the model that exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is effectively governed by the international community’s High Representative, who has sweeping powers.

Diplomats who have talked to ISN Security Watch, on condition of anonymity, say the only disagreement among the Contact Group members is over speed and tactics.

“We all know, more or less, where we are going but we just have to be careful of the language used in public,” one source said.

At the moment, officials from Contact Group countries say publicly that what they want is an agreement made between and mutually acceptable to Serbs and Albanians. Yet, privately, everyone knows that Serbs and Albanians will never be able to agree on the status of Kosovo.

France is less willing to openly say that the Contact Group countries are in favor of conditional independence because it fears that to do so might prompt the Serbs to withdraw from talks before they have even properly started.

By contrast, the British believe that the sooner the “I” word (for independence) is pronounced, the more flexible the Albanians will become. The British theory, according to informed sources, is that given a guarantee that independence (conditional or otherwise) is coming, the Albanians will be more amenable to granting the Kosovo Serbs concessions such as extensive decentralization.

As to whether moving Kosovo towards independence might provoke a nationalist radicalization of Serbia, one source in favor of moving faster rather than slower, simply sums up the Serbian dilemma as one of “Belarus or Brussels”. That is to say that Serbia has a choice between renewed isolation or continuing along its current path towards European integration. :twisted:

It is clear to Serbian leaders that US policymakers have little sympathy for the Serbian efforts to keep Kosovo. However, what is unclear is that there appears to be no compelling reason (other than realpolitik,) as to why the US should favor independence for the Kosovo Albanians but oppose it for Iraqi Kurds, for instance.

Serbs have looked for support in meetings in Moscow and with the French. The Russians, while promising Serbian leaders that they would oppose anything Belgrade does not agree with, say in private talks with their western counterparts that they will not oppose conditional independence for Kosovo.

France then was perhaps the last best hope for the Serbian leadership, but here too, in a series of meetings this month, the Serbs have been disappointed. According to ISN Security Watch sources, the Serbs were told that France would support Serbian interests but that those interests had to be realistic. Holding on to Kosovo, in any form, was not considered realistic. :P

In public and private, the Serbs are now pursuing different lines of attack. Predrag Simic, Serbia and Montenegro’s ambassador to France and a member of the Serbian Kosovo negotiating team, evokes the situation leading up to the Second World War to argue against independence for Kosovo.

“In 1938,” he says, the Western powers, fearful of Hitler, accepted his demand to annex the Sudetenland, the predominantly German inhabited area of Czechoslovakia. But this appeasement “brought neither peace nor security to Europe”.

However, in private, according to western diplomatic sources, Serbian President Tadic is exploring a more flexible agenda. He wants any settlement to secure the future of the Kosovo Serbs and wants to try and steer proponents of conditional independence into making sure that if this cannot be avoided then, at least for the foreseeable future, Kosovo will have no army or highly symbolic seat at the UN.

But Western diplomats are fearful of what they call the “disaster scenario”, which foresees the talks failing to gain traction and hardliners on either side opting for violence.

The disaster scenario sees either Serbian or Albanian hardliners provoking an exodus from the Serbian enclaves in Kosovo. There are some100,000 Serbs in Kosovo, of which 30,000 live in the solidly Serbian north, while the rest are scattered in enclaves in central and southern Kosovo.

Albanian hardliners could decide to attack the enclaves and provoke the flight of the Serbs there, so as to prevent the areas from becoming autonomous regions that would remain, in their view, like Serbian claws in a future independent Kosovo.

By contrast Serbian hardliners could seek to provoke a Serbian exodus from the enclaves in a bid to solidify the Serbian population of the north. Their hope would be that many years down the line the de facto partition that already exists along the Ibar river would one day be recognized as the international frontier between the part of Kosovo that Serbia managed to save and the Albanian part, which would be independent.

It is precisely because they want to avert such a disaster scenario that the diplomats are now talking intensively to the Serbs and Albanians and among themselves.

Indeed, the message diplomats are now delivering to the Kosovo Albanians might come as a surprise to some. According to one source, the Albanians have been warned not to let hardliners provoke violence, but they have also been told that since conditional independence is the aim, “The talks are not about the status of Kosovo. What they are really about then, is negotiating the status of the Serbs in Kosovo,” the source said.

[moni12]

R u online signorita?
Great article by Judah -he's a high calibre analyst

and a very positive attitude from the Britts:

By contrast, the British believe that the sooner the “I” word (for independence) is pronounced, the more flexible the Albanians will become. The British theory, according to informed sources, is that given a guarantee that independence (conditional or otherwise) is coming, the Albanians will be more amenable to granting the Kosovo Serbs concessions such as extensive decentralization.